7 Social Evolution: Alternatives and Variations (Introduction)*
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III. Aspects of Social Evolution 7 Social Evolution: Alternatives and Variations (Introduction)* Dmitri M. Bondarenko, Leonid E. Grinin, Andrey V. Korotayev It has always been peculiar to evolutionists to compare social and biological evolution, the latter as visualized by Charles Darwin.1 But it also seems possible and correct to draw an analogy with another great discovery in the field of evolutionary biology, with the homologous series of Nikolay Vavilov (1921, 1927, 1967). However, there is no complete identity between cultural parallelism and biological homologous series. Vavilov studied the morphological homology, whereas our focus within the realm of social evolution is the functional one. No doubt, the morphological homomorphism also happens in the process of social evolution (e.g., in the Hawaii Islands where a type of the sociocultural organization surprisingly similar with the ones of other highly developed parts of Polynesia had independently formed by the end of the 18th century [Sahlins 1972/1958; Goldman 1970; Earle 1978; Johnson and Earle 2000; Seaton 1978]). But this topic is beyond the present article's problematique. What is important for us here is that there are reasons to suppose that an equal level of sociopolitical (and cultural) complexity (which makes it possible to solve equally difficult problems faced by societies) can be achieved not only in various forms but on essentially different evolutionary pathways, too. Thus, it is possible to achieve the same level of system complexity through differing pathways of evolution which appeared simultaneously (and even prior to the formation of Homo sapiens sapiens [Butovskaya and Feinberg 1993; Butovskaya 1994, 2000; Butovskaya, Korotayev, and Kazankov 2000]) and increased in quantity throughout almost whole sociocultural advancement (Pavlenko 1996: 229–251; 2000). Diversity could be regarded as one of the most important preconditions of the evolutionary process. This implies that the transition to any qualitatively higher level of socio-cultural complexity is normally impossible without a sufficient level of variability at the preceding complexity level (among both the given culture's predecessors and contemporaries).2 Within the first level of analysis, all evolutionary variability can be reduced to two principally different groups of homologous series (Bondarenko 1997: 12–15; 1998a, 2000b; Bondarenko and Korotayev 1999, 2000b; Korotayev et al. 2000). Earlier these alternatives were distinguished either as ‘hierarchical’ vs. ‘non-hierarchical’ (e.g., Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000a), or ‘hierarchical’ vs. ‘heterarchical’ (e.g., Ehrenreich et al. 1995; Crumley 2001). In one of the publications on the problem of heterarchy the latter is defined as ‘...the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways’ (Ehrenreich et al. 1995: 3; see also Crumley 1979: 144). It is clear that the second version of heterarchy is more relevant for the study of the complex societies. However, when we have a system of elements which ‘possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways’, it seems impossible to speak about the absence of hierarchy. In this case we rather deal with a system of heterarchically arranged hierarchies. Hence, it does not appear reasonable to denote the heterarchy alternative as ‘hierarchy’. We would rather suggest designating it as ‘homoarchy’ which could be defined as the relation of elements to one another when they possess the potential for being ranked in one way only. Totalitarian regimes of any time give us plenty of examples of such a sociocultural situation when the ruled have no chances to get ranked above the rulers in any possible contexts. This stands in a sharp contrast with, say, an archetypal example of a complex heterarchical system – the civil community (polis) of Athens (the 5th–4th centuries ВС) where the citizens ranked lower within one hierarchy (e.g., the military one) could well be ranked higher in many other possible respects (e.g., economically, or within the subsystem of civil/religious magistrates). Consequently, it was impossible to say that one citizen was higher than any other in any absolute sense. On the other hand, it seems necessary to stress that it appears impossible to find not only any cultures totally lacking any hierarchies (including informal ones), but also any totally homoarchical cultures. Hence, though in order to simplify our analysis in this paper we speak about heterarchical and homoarchical evolutionary pathways for our analysis' simplifying, in fact we are dealing here with heterarchy-homoarchy axis along which one could range all the known human cultures. Within this range there does not seem to be any distinct border between homoarchical and heterarchical cultures; hence, in reality it might be more appropriate to speak not about just two evolutionary pathways (heterarchical and homoarchical), but about a potentially infinite number of such pathways, and, thus, finally not about evolutionary pathways, but rather about evolutionary probability field (see for details Korotayev 1992, 1999, 2003c, 2004; Korotayev et al. 2000). Yet, as was mentioned above, in order to simplify our analysis we speak about just two alternative pathways. In particular, until recently it was considered self-evident that just the formation of the state marked the end of the ‘Primitive Epoch’ and alternatives to the state did not actually exist.3 All the stateless societies were considered pre-state ones, standing on the single evolutionary staircase squarely below the states. Nowadays postulates about the state as the only possible form of political and sociocultural organization of the post-primitive society, about a priori higher level of development of a state society in comparison with any non-state one are subjected to rigid criticism. It has become evident that the non-state societies are not necessarily less complex and less efficient. The problem of existence of non-state but not primitive (i.e. principally nоn- and not pre-state) societies, alternatives to the state (as the allegedly inevitable post-primitive form of the sociopolitical organization) deserves attention. Of course, in no way do we reject the fact of existence and importance of the states in world history. What we argue, is that the state is not the only possible post-primitive evolutionary political form. From our point of view, the state is nothing more than one of many forms of the post-primitive sociopolitical organization; these forms are alternative to each other and are able in certain conditions to transform to one another without any loss in the general level of complexity. Hence, the degree of sociopolitical centralization and ‘homoarchization’ is not a perfect criterion for evaluating a society's evolutionary level, though it is regarded as such within unilinear concepts of social evolution. As Brumfiel wrote several years ago, ‘the coupling of [sociopolitical] differentiation and hierarchy is so firm in our minds that it takes tremendous intellectual efforts even imagine what differentiation without hierarchy could be’ (Brumfiel 1995: 130).4 Usually, even if the very existence of complex but non-homoarchical cultures is recognized, they are regarded as a historical fortuity, as an anomaly. Such cultures are declared as if capable to reach rather low levels of complexity only, as if incapable to find internal stability (Tuden and Marshall 1972: 454–456). Thus, on the further level of analysis the dichotomy turns out not to be rigid at all as far as actual organization of any society employs both vertical (dominance – subordination) and horizontal (apprehended as ties among equals) links. Furthermore, in the course of their history, societies (including archaic cultures) turn out capable to change models of sociopolitical organization radically, transforming from homoarchical into heterarchical or vice versa (Korotayev 1995d, 2006; Korotayev, Kradin, and Lynsha 2000; Korotayev, Klimenko, and Prusakov 2007; Crumley 1987: 164–165; 1995: 4; 2001; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000c; Dozhdev 2000; Kradin 2000a). Perhaps the most well known historical example of the latter case is Rome where the Republic was established and further democratized with the Plebian political victories. Note that in the course of such transformations the organizational background changes, but the overall level of cultural complexity may not only increase or decrease but may well stay practically the same (for example in ancient and medieval history of Europe, the Americas, Asia, see on this Korotayev 1995d, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1998, 2000с, 2000d, 2006; Korotayev, Klimenko, and Prusakov 2007; van der Vliet 1987; Ferguson 1991; Korotayev 1995a, 1996a; Levy 1995; Lynsha 1998; Beliaev 2000b; Chamblee 2000: 15–35; Dozhdev 2000; Kowalewski 2000; Kradin 2000a; Grinin 2004b, 2004c; 2007g, 2007h). Nevertheless, vertical and horizontal links play different parts in different societies at every concrete moment. Already among the primates with the same level of morphological and cognitive development, and even among primate populations belonging to the same species, one could observe both more and less heterarchically/homoarchically organized groups. Hence, the non-linearity of sociopolitical evolution originates already before the Homo sapiens sapiens formation (Butovskaya and Feinberg 1993; Butovskaya 1994; Butovskaya, Korotayev, and Kazankov 2000). Let us consider now in more details one of the most influential and widespread unilineal evolutionary schemes, the one proposed by Service (1971 [1962]; its outline is, however, already contained in Sahlins's well-known article [Sahlins 1960: 37]): band – tribe – chiefdom – state. The scheme implies that the growth of the political complexity (at least up to the stage of the agrarian state) is inevitably accompanied by the growth of the inequality, stratification, the social distance between the rulers and the ruled, the ‘authoritarianism’ and hierarchization of the political system, decrease of the political participation of the main mass of population etc. Of course, these two sets of parameters seem to be related rather closely. It is evident that we observe here a certain correlation, and a rather strong one. But, no doubt, this is just a correlation, and by no means a functional dependence. Of course, this correlation implies a perfectly possible line of sociopolitical evolution – from an egalitarian, acephalous band, through a big-man village community with much more pronounced inequality and political hierarchy, to an ‘authoritarian’ village community with a strong power of its chief (found, e.g., among some Indians of the North-West Coast – see, e.g., Carneiro 2000), and than through the true chiefdoms having even more pronounced stratification and concentration of the political power in the hands of the chief, to the complex chiefdoms where the political inequality parameters reach a qualitatively higher levels, and finally to the agrarian state where all such parameters reach their culmination (though one could move even further, up to the level of the ‘empire’ [e.g., Adams 1975], see an example of such a line in Johnson and Earle 2000: 246, 304). However, it is very important to stress that on each level of the growing political complexity one could find easily evident alternatives to this evolutionary line. Let us start with the human societies of the simplest level of sociocultural complexity. Indeed, one can easily observe that acephalous egalitarian bands are found among most of the unspecialized hunter-gatherers. However, as has been shown by Woodburn (1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988a, 1988b) and Artemova (1987, 1991, 1993, 2000a, 2000b; see also Chudinova 1981; Whyte 1978: 49–94), some of such hunter-gatherers (the inegalitarian ones, first of all most of the Australian aborigine see also Bern 1979) display a significantly different type of sociopolitical organization with much more structured political leadership concentrated in the hands of relatively hierarchically organized elders, with a pronounced degree of inequality both between the men and women, and among the men themselves.5 On the next level of the political complexity we can also find communities with both homoarchical and heterarchical political organization. One can mention e.g., the well-known contrast between the Indians of the Californian North-West and South-East: The Californian chiefs were in the center of economic life, they exercised their control over the production, distribution and exchange of the social product, and their power and authority were based mainly on this. Gradually the power of the chiefs and elders acquired the hereditary character, it became a typical phenomenon for California... Only the tribes populating the North-West of California, notwithstanding their respectively developed and complex material culture, lacked the explicitly expressed social roles of the chiefs characteristic for the rest of California. At the meantime they new slavery... The population of this region had an idea of personal wealth... (Kabo 1986: 20). One can also immediately recall the socio-culturally complex communities of the Ifugao (e.g., Barton 1922; Meshkov 1982: 183–197) lacking any pronounced authoritarian political leadership compared with the one of the communities of the North-West Coast, but with a comparable level of overall sociopolitical and sociocultural complexity. Hence, already on the levels of simple and middle range communities we observe several types of alternative sociopolitical forms, each of which should be denoted with a separate term. The possible alternatives to the chiefdom in the prehistoric Southwest Asia, heterarchical systems of complex acephalous communities with a pronounced autonomy of single family households have been analyzed recently by Berezkin who suggests reasonably Ара Tanis as their ethnographic parallel (1995a, 1995b, 2000). Frantsouzoff finds an even more developed example of such type of polities in ancient South Arabia in Wadi Hadramawt of the 1st millennium ВС (Frantsouzoff 1995, 1997, 2000a, 2000b). One of the present authors has pointed out elsewhere (Grinin 2007g) that probably some intertribal secret societies can also be considered as a form of political organization alternative to the chiefdom (see, e.g., Кubbel' 1988а: 241), as well as, for example, complex age-grade systems that allowed creation of firm horizontal ties between separate communities within a tribe and between related tribes (on the role of such an age-grade system among some Naga tribes of mountainous North-East India see, e.g., Мaretina 1995: 83; on some other examples see Kalinovskaya 1976; van Gennep 2002, etc.). As an analogue to the chiefdom the organized groups of turncoats, adventurers or criminals of different sorts that do not recognize any official authorities can be considered too (see Grinin 2007g). Not infrequently such armed communities were created as counterbalance to the consolidating official power of a new state. ‘This part of the population that has separated itself and does not recognize laws often acquires considerable power due to freedom of being anyway restricted by the law..., as well as to respect of the bravest and poorest from the neighboring tribes’ (Ratzel' 1902, vol. 1: 445). Another evident alternative to the chiefdom is constituted by the tribal organization. As is well known, the tribe has found itself on the brink of being evicted from the evolutionary models (Townsend 1985: 146; Carneiro 1987: 760). However, the political forms entirely identical with what was described by Service as the tribe could be actually found in, e.g., medieval and modern Middle East (up to the present): these tribal systems normally comprise several communities and often have precisely the type of political leadership described by Service as typical for the tribe (Service 1971 [1962]: 103–104; Dresch 1984: 39, 41). What is important, is that we are dealing here with some type of polity that could not be identified either with bands, or with village communities (because such tribes normally comprise more than one community), or with chiefdoms (because they have an entirely different type of political leadership), or, naturally, with states. They could not be inserted easily either in the scheme somewhere between the village and the chiefdom. Indeed, as has been shown convincingly by Carneiro (see, e.g., 1970, 1981, 1987, 1991, 2000), chiefdoms normally arose as a result of political centralization of a few communities without the stage of the tribe preceding this. On the other hand, a considerable amount of evidence could be produced suggesting that in the Middle East many tribes arose as a result of political decentralization of chiefdoms which preceded the tribes in time. It is also important to stress that this could not in any way be identified with a ‘regression’, ‘decline’, or ‘degeneration’, as we can observe in many of such cases that political decentralization is accompanied by the increase (rather than decrease) of overall sociocultural complexity (Korotayev 1995a, 1995c, 1995d, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b). Hence, in many respects tribal systems of the Middle Eastern type appear to be chiefdom alternatives (rather than chiefdom predecessors). Large complex chiefdoms could have analogues too. First and foremost, those were large tribal confederations or federations. Not infrequently, however, in such cases the bottom structure was represented by a sort of chiefdom while the top one was formed by the tribal council without a permanent leader (the council of chiefs or elders). This was the case of some American Indians tribes' structure. The tribes of the Iroquois had another organization system: family-clan units were headed by clan elders (sachems) who were the tribal council members. At the same time the Iroquois confederation also had the supreme administrative level – the League council in which clan chiefs of each tribe were represented (fifty persons in total [see Fenton 1978: 122]) and in which consensus for making up decisions was necessary. As it organized a great number of people and provided exceptionally high level of integration, we regard the Iroquois political system as an analogue (though incomplete) not to the chiefdom but to the early state (for details see Grinin 2007g; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b: Essay 5). Such analogues to the chiefdom as communities federations and confederations of, for example, the highlanders are also worth noting (see, e.g., Aglarov 1988; Кorotayev 1995e, 1995f, 2006b; Grinin 2007g). We have argued elsewhere (Кorotayev 1995b, 1995с, 1995e) that in general there is an evident evolutionary alternative to the development of the rigid supra-communal political structures (chiefdom – complex chiefdom – state) constituted by the development of internal communal structures together with soft supra-communal systems not alienating communal sovereignty (various confederations, amphictyonies, etc.). One of the most impressive results of the sociopolitical development along this evolutionary line is the Greek poleis (see Berent [1994, 1996, 2000a, 2000b] regarding the statelessness of this type of political systems) some of which reached overall levels of complexity quite comparable not only with the ones of chiefdoms, but also with the one of states. The same can be said about its Roman analogue, the civitas (Shtaerman 1989). Note that polis/civitas as a form of sociopolitical organization was known far beyond the Classical world, both in geographical and chronological sense (Korotayev 1995b; Bondarenko 1998b), though quite a number of scholars still insist on its uniqueness.6 The ‘tribal’ and ‘polis’ series seem to constitute separate evolutionary lines, with some distinctive features: the ‘polis’ forms imply the power of the ‘magistrates’ elected in one or another way for fixed periods and controlled by the people in the absence (or near-absence) of any formal bureaucracy. Within the tribal systems we observe the absence of any offices whose holders would be obeyed simply because they hold posts of a certain type, and the order is sustained by elaborate mechanisms of mediation and search for consensus. There is also a considerable number of other complex stateless polities (like the ones of the Cossacks of Ukraine and Southern Russia till the end of the 17th century [Chirkin 1955; Rozner 1970; Nikitin 1987; Shtyrbul 2006; Grinin 2007g: 179–180], the Celts of the 5th–1st centuries ВС [Grinin 1997: 32–33; 2003: 141–142; 2004c: 97–98; 2006b: 95–96; 2007a: 173; 2007g: 182–184; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b: 435–436; Кradin 2001: 149], or the Icelandic polity of the ‘Age of Democracy’ till the middle of the 13th century [Ol'geirsson 1957; Gurevich 1972; Steblin-Kamenskiy 1984; Hjaul'marsson 2003; Grinin 2003: 139; 2004c: 95; 2006b: 93; 2007a: 172; 2007g: 179; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b: 432) which could not yet be denoted with any commonly accepted terms, and whose own self-designations are often too complex (like Kazach'e Vojsko) to have any chance to get transformed to general terms. There were a great many of historically and ethnographically known polities that a) surpassed considerably typical prestate socio-political forms (like simple chiefdoms, tribes, local communities) in size, complexity level and some other parameters; b) were not inferior to the early-state systems in size, socio-cultural and/or political complexity; c) at the same time, basically differed from the early state in their political order, power and administration structure (Alexeev et al. 2004; Beliaev et al. 2002; Bondarenko 1995a, 1995b, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Bondarenko, Grinin, and Korotayev 2002, 2004; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000a, 2000c; Bondarenko and Sledzevski 2000; Crumley 1995, 2001, 2005; Grinin 2000c, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004c, 2007a, 2007b; Grinin et al. 2004, 2006; Korotayev 1995b; Kradin et al. 2000; Kradin, Bondarenko, and Barfield 2003; Kradin and Lynsha 1995; McIntosh 1999; Possehl 1998; Schaedel 1995; Bondarenko, Grinin, and Korotayev 2006; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2002; Girenko 1993; Grinin 1997–2001 [1997, № 5], 2001–2006, 2002с, 2006d, 2007g, 2007h, 2007i; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b; Korotayev 1995d, 1995e, 1996b, 1997, 2000c, 2000d, 2006; Kradin and Lynsha 1995; Kradin and Bondarenko 2002; Ророv 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Shtyrbul 2006). Elsewhere we have designated the non-state societies comparable to the state in complexity and the functions performed as |
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