Text 8b: Aristotle, Metaph. Θ 6, 1048b18-36, translation D. Ross
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the losing weight, or slimming-down, and the bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already (20) that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end) ; but that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured). At the same time we are living well and have lived well, (25) and are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases : but, as things are, it does not cease ; we are living and have lived.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete : making thin, learning, walking, building ; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time (30) a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.
| Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν ἢ ἰσχνασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ (20) ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος)· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη <ᾗ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ἡ] πρᾶξις. οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑώρακε,> καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ’ ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται·
εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, (25) καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δ’ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν.
τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ’ ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα (30) βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.
|
Text 8c: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10, 4, 1174a13 ff., trans. Ross
Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being later (15) will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, it is not a motion. For every motion (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made (20) what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all motions are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole motion and from each other (...) They differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time (...) it seems that is not complete at any and every time, but that the many motions are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form (1174b5) is complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased ; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.
From these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers are not right in saying that pleasure is a motion or a coming into being. For these (10) cannot be ascribed to all things, but only to those that are divisible and not wholes ; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a motion or coming into being; therefore there is no motion or coming into being of pleasure either ; for it is a whole.
| δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ’ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον (15) γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ’ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ’ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ (20) οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. (...) τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι (...) ἔοικε δ’ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ’ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν (5) χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ’ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή.
δόξειε δ’ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ (10) γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.
|
Text 8d: Aristotle, On the Soul, 3, 7, 431a6-7, transl. Hicks
For motion is, as we saw, an activity of that which is imperfect ; but activity in the absolute sense, that is, the activity of that which has reached perfection, is quite distinct.
| ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ’ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου.
| Text 8e: John Philoponus, In De anima, 3, 7, p. 558, 16 ff. Hayduck
And whenever the sense-object is present and the sense acts, the sense is brought to actuality by the presence of the sense-object. It is not through motion that it comes to be actual. Sense is not affected or altered when it is brought from potentiality of the second kind to (20) being actual. For Aristotle does not want what is brought from the second sort of potentiality to the second sort of actuality to be altered nor to be affected, so it is either not motion or another kind of motion. For if anyone wants to call this ‘motion’ let him call it another species of motion over and above those mentioned in the Physics, and introduce a new classification of nature. Then he [Aristotle] also establishes that the advance (25) from the second kind of potentiality to the second kind of actuality is not motion. For he says that ‘motion is the actuality of what is incomplete’ (for motion is transported from the incomplete to the complete, and it [the incomplete thing] is affected and altered) but what is potential in the second way is complete. The activity of things that are complete is not motion but something else besides motion. So the passage from the second sort of potentiality (30) to the second sort of actuality is not a motion but a change.
| ὁπηνίκα δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν παρῇ καὶ ἐνεργήσῃ ἡ αἴσθησις, τότε ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρουσίας ἄγεται εἰς ἐνέργειαν. ἔρχεται δὲ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ διὰ κινήσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ πάσχει οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦται ἡ αἴσθησις ἀγομένη ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου δυνάμει εἰς (20) τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. βούλεται γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου δυνάμει εἰς τὸ δεύτερον ἐνεργείᾳ ἀγόμενον μὴ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν, ὅθεν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις ἢ ἄλλο εἶδός ἐστι κινήσεως. εἰ γάρ τις κίνησιν ἐθέλοι ταύτην λέγειν, λεγέτω ἄλλο κινήσεως εἶδος παρὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ λεχθέντα καὶ καινοτομείτω τὴν φύσιν.
εἶτα καὶ κατασκευάζει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις ἡ (25) ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου δυνάμει εἰς τὸ δεύτερον ἐνεργείᾳ πρόοδος. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἀπὸ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τέλειον φέρεται, καὶ πάσχει καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται), τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δυνάμει τέλειόν ἐστι· τῶν δὲ τελείων ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις, ἀλλ’ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν κίνησιν. οὐκ ἄρα οὖν κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου δυνάμει ἀγωγὴ (30) εἰς τὸ δεύτερον ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ μεταβολή.
|
Text 8f: Aristotle, On the soul 2, 5, 417a22- , translation Hicks
We must also draw a distinction in regard to the terms potentiality and actuality: at present we are using them without qualification. For instance, we may use the term knowledgeable, firstly, in the sense in which we might speak of man as knowledgeable, because man is one of the genus of beings which are knowledgeable and have knowledge ; secondly, in the sense in which we at once call the man knowledgeable who has learnt, say, grammar.
(25) Now of these two men each possesses the capacity, but in a different sense : the one because the genus to which he belongs, that is to say, his matter, is potentially knowledgeable ; the other because he is capable, if he chose, of contemplating, provided there is nothing external to hinder. Whereas he who is at the moment contemplating is in actuality and knows the object A in front of him in the proper sense of the term. Thus the first two are both potentially knowledgeable: (30) the first becomes knowledgeable actually after he has undergone qualitative change through instruction and often after transition from the reverse condition ; while in the latter case it is by (417b1) another kind of transition that the man passes from the mere possession, without the use, of sensation or grammar to the use of it (...) it is by exercise of knowledge that the possessor (5) of knowledge becomes such in actuality: and this either is no alteration (for the thing develops into its own nature and actuality), or else is alteration of a different sort. Hence it is not right to say that that which thinks is altered when it thinks any more than the builder is altered when he builds. That, then, which works the change from potential existence to actuality in a thinking and (10) intelligent being should properly receive a different name and not be called instruction : while that which learns and is brought from potential to actual knowledge by that which is in actuality and capable of instructing should either not be said to be acted upon at all, or else two modes of alteration should be assumed, one change to the dispositions of privation (15) and the other to the habits and nature.
| διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας· νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιστῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην· ἔστι δ’ ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν·
(25) ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ’ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν· ὁ δ’ ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι, κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες (30) <ὄντες, ἐνεργείᾳ γίνονται ἐπιστήμονες,> ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, ὁ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν (417b.) ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἄλλοντρόπον (...) θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον (5) τὴν ἐπιστήμην,
ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγειν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος [κατὰ] τὸ νοοῦν καὶ (10) φρονοῦν οὐ διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δίκαιον· τὸ δ’ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον, [ὥσπερ εἴρηται,] ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν (15) καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν.
|
|