Text 13: Philoponus, aet. mundi, 4, 4, p. 64, 22-65, 26 Rabe, translation Share (mod.)
It is, I believe, clear to everyone that it is not right to suppose that God's producing, or activity in general, is motion when it brings everything into substantification95 just by willing it and has no need of time or any extension (25) for the substantification of realities. For it is not the case that every activity is immediately (p. 65, 1) also a motion, for activity, according to Aristotle, has a broader extension than motion. For he says that activity is of two kinds, complete and incomplete. Incomplete activity is, he says, motion. For, according to him, motion is change from first potentiality (5) to state (hexis). This is how he defines it in book three of the Physics : ‘motion is the actualization of what potentially is, qua such’. By ‘actualization’ (entelekheia) he means the actual (autên) actuality and perfection of the potential. So motion (10) is incomplete actuality. By complete activity, on the other hand, he means instantaneous projection from a state (hexis) without the state being altered in any way. Instantaneous projection is production that does not proceed with the motion of time but happens in the now, like the emanation of light from a source (15) of illumination ; for as soon as a source of illumination such as a fire or the sun is visible, everything with an aptitude for it is instantaneously illuminated. Of this kind too is the activity of seeing : we intemporally perceive sensible objects the moment we look at them. It is for this reason that Aristotle (20) denies that the senses are in motion during the perception of sensible objects. Nor is the activity of the mind motion ; it touches the objects of thought (ta noêta) instantaneously and without any extension. If, then, the activity of these is timeless, and on that account complete and not motion, how could
dare to say (25) that the activity of God is motion?
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δʹ. Ὅτι δὲ οὐ θέμις τὴν ποίησιν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ὅλως τὴν ἐνέργειαν κίνησιν ὑποτίθεσθαι αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ θέλειν πάντα παράγουσαν καὶ χρόνου ἢ διαστάσεώς τινος εἰς οὐσίωσιν τῶν πραγμάτων μὴ δεομένην, (25) παντὶ δῆλον οἶμαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια εὐθὺς (65.) καὶ κίνησίς ἐστιν· ἐπιπλέον γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κινήσεως, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ. διττὴν γὰρ εἶναί φησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὴν μὲν τελείαν, τὴν δὲ ἀτελῆ. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀτελῆ ἐνέργειαν κίνησιν εἶναί φησιν· ἔστιν γὰρ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου δυνάμει (5) ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν μεταβολή· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ λόγῳ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡρίσατο, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ᾗ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἐντελέχειαν δέ φησιν αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ τελείωσιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἀτελής ἐστιν (10) ἐνέργεια ἡ κίνησις. τελείαν δὲ ἐνέργειάν φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀθρόαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως προβολὴν μηδὲν ἀλλοιοτέρας γινομένης τῆς ἕξεως.
ἀθρόα δέ ἐστιν προβολὴ ἡ μὴ συμπροϊοῦσα τῇ κινήσει τοῦ χρόνου ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ νῦν γιγνομένη, οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκ τοῦ φωτί (15) ζοντος πρόοδος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φανῆναι τὸ φωτιστικὸν οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸν ἥλιον ἀθρόον πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτήδειον καταλάμπεται. τοιαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἀναβλέψαι ἀχρόνως τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁ Ἀρι- (20) στοτέλης κινεῖσθαί φησιν ἐν τῇ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλήψει. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια κίνησίς ἐστιν· ἀθρόως γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς διαστάσεως τοῦ νοητοῦ θιγγάνει. εἰ οὖν ἡ τούτων ἐνέργεια ἄχρονος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τελεία καὶ οὐ κίνησις, πῶς ἂν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ (25) ἐνέργειαν κίνησιν εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν;
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Text 14: Philoponus, In De Anima 2, 5, p. 296, 22-298, 23 Hayduck, translation Charlton, modified
For even if motion is a kind of activity, activity is more universal than motion, and motion than being affected. For everything that is affected is also moved, and everything that is in motion acts, but it is not also the case that what acts is also in motion. For activity, as he himself defines it in the Physics [3.2], is the instantaneous (25) projection from the state (hexis)96, whereas motion is an incomplete activity ; for motion is the path from the first sense of potentiality to the state97. Inasmuch, then, as motion is a kind of incomplete activity, to that extent activity and motion seem to be the same. But in so far as activity is not the advance from the incomplete to the perfect, in that respect motion is not the same as activity. And just as ‘disposition’ (diathesis) is said in a more common (30) way that applies also to a state (hexis), and also in a more particular way in contradistinction from a state, so too ‘activity’ is said both in a more common way of every motion, and also it is said in contradistinction from motion ; because motion is the advance from the first kind of potentiality to the second of the things that are in conjunction (297, 1) with the substance, the substance being preserved, while activity is the perfect projection of the state, without the state being altered in any way. And activity which is in reality perfect is the instantaneous projection of the state, which does not progress along with the motion of time, but is identical in every part of it, as is the projection of light ; for simultaneously with the appearance of the source of light, all that is suitable (5) is illuminated instantaneously ; the activity of light does not progress along with the motion of time, but is identical in every part of it. Such is the activity of sense also. At the same time as we look, we apprehend the sense-objects in a non-temporal way. Hence he does not say that the senses are in motion, but that they act.
This, then, is activity in the proper sense. Hence he also says concerning the divine things (10) that they are activities without potentiality. But a motion like learning is the change of the state part by part to the perfect from the imperfect. In between these are the discursive motions98 or activities, and anything similar there may be ; these are neither motions in the proper sense (for there is no change of the state) nor altogether activities ; for neither are they identical in every part (15) of time, nor is their projection from the state instantaneous, but one premise comes before another, and the conclusion is last. So this sort of thing is neither motion without qualification nor activity without qualification, unless one were to divide activity in the proper sense into what is instantaneous and partless and what has parts.
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κἂν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια καθολικωτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς κινήσεως, ἡ δὲ κίνησις τοῦ πάσχειν. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάσχον καὶ κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον πᾶν ἐνεργεῖ, οὐκέτι μέντοι τὸ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ κινεῖται. ἐνέργεια μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς διωρίσατο ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἡ ἀθρόα προ- (25) βολὴ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, κίνησις δὲ ἀτελής ἐστιν ἐνέργεια· ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου δυνάμει ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ὁδὸς κίνησίς ἐστι. ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις ἀτελής, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν δόξει εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις· ᾗ δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον πρόοδος, ταύτῃ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡ κίνησις τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ διάθεσις λέγεται μὲν καὶ κοινό- (30) τερον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως, λέγεται δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῆς ἕξεως ἰδικώτερον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια λέγεται καὶ κοινότερον καὶ κατὰ πάσης κινήσεως, λέγεται δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῆς κινήσεως, διότι κίνησις μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου δυνάμει ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον πρόοδός τινος τῶν περὶ (297.) τὴν οὐσίαν σωζομένης αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας, ἐνέργεια δέ ἐστιν ἡ τελεία προβολὴ τῆς ἕξεως μηδὲν τῆς ἕξεως ἀλλοιοτέρας γινομένης. καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι τελεία ἐνέργεια ἡ ἀθρόα προβολὴ τῆς ἕξεως ἡ μὴ συμπροϊοῦσα τῇ κινήσει τοῦ χρόνου, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πᾶν μέρος αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχουσα, οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φωτὸς προβολή· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φανῆναι τὸ φωτιστικὸν ἀθρόον πᾶν (5) τὸ ἐπιτήδειον καταλάμπεται, οὐ συμπροϊούσης τῆς τοῦ φωτὸς ἐνεργείας τῇ τοῦ χρόνου κινήσει, ἀλλ’ ἐν παντὶ μέρει αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως ἐχούσης. τοιαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἀναβλέψαι ἀχρόνως τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα· ὅθεν οὐδέ φησι κινεῖσθαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ’ἐνεργεῖν.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐνέργεια κυρίως· διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν θείων εἶπεν (10) ὅτι ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνέργειαί εἰσι. κίνησις δ’ οἷον ἡ μάθησις ἡ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστι μεταβολὴ κατὰ μέρος ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων εἰσὶν αἱ διανοητικαὶ κινήσεις ἤτοι ἐνέργειαι, καὶ εἴ τι ταύταις ὅμοιον, αἵτινες οὔτε κυρίως κινήσεις εἰσίν (οὐ γάρ ἐστι μεταβολὴ τῆς ἕξεως) οὔτε καθάπαξ ἐνέργειαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν ἐν παντὶ μέρει (15) χρόνου, οὐδὲ ἀθρόα αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως ἡ προβολὴ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλη πρὸ ἄλλης πρότασις, ἔσχατον δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα. οὔτε οὖν ἁπλῶς κίνησις τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔτε ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια, εἰ μὴ τὴν κυρίως ἐνέργειαν διέλοι τις εἴς τε τὴν ἀθρόαν καὶ ἀμερῆ καὶ εἰς τὴν μεριστήν.
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Text 15: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, fr. 115 Wildberg = Simplicius, In Phys., p. 1141, 12-30
“…even if nature produces what it fashions out of existent things, by virtue of the fact that it has both its substance and its activity in a substrate, without which it is not capable either of being or of acting, it is not necessary for God, whose substance and activity are transcendent of all beings, to create (15) out of existent things. For in that case, He would be no better than nature, although God creates not only the forms of the things that are fashioned directly by Him, but it is believed that He produces and fashions matter itself; for only what is first is ungenerated and uncaused. If, then, God gives existence (20) to matter as well, but matter does not require another matter in order to exist, for it is the first substrate of all natural things, then it is not the case that everything that comes into being does so out of something that exists. For whether matter comes into being from God always or at a given moment, it will certainly have no need of another matter, since it itself is the first substrate of bodies. If what is generated by nature does so out of what exists, therefore, it is not (25) necessary that the things that are generated by God do so out of what exists, since nature needs both some time and generation in order to fashion each natural thing, while God gives existence to what comes into being directly by him timelessly and without generation, that is, without forming and shaping the particulars. For it is enough for him to will, in order to bring about the substantification (ousiôsis)99 (30) of realities”.
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“πρῶτον μέν, λέγων, εἰ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐξ ὄντων ποιεῖ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δημιουργούμενα διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνου μήτε εἶναι μήτε ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐξῃρημένην ἔχοντα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (15) ἐξ ὄντων δημιουργεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕξει πλέον τῆς φύσεως, καίτοι γε οὐ μόνον τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀμέσως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δημιουργουμένων ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην παράγειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν πεπίστευται· μόνον γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγένητόν ἐστι καὶ ἀναίτιον. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὴν ὕλην (20) ὁ θεὸς ὑφίστησιν (οὐ δεῖται δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρας ὕλης εἰς ὕπαρξιν· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον ἁπάντων τῶν φυσικῶν ὑποκείμενον)· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ ὄντος γίνεται. εἴτε γὰρ ἀεὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ γίνεται ἡ ὕλη εἴτε ποτέ, οὐ δεήσεται δήπουθεν ἑτέρας ὕλης, αὐτὴ τὸ πρῶτον οὖσα τῶν σωμάτων ὑποκείμενον· οὐκ ἄρα, εἰ τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐξ ὄντων γίνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀμέσως ὑπὸ θεοῦ γινόμενα ἐξ ὄντων γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ ἡ (25) μὲν φύσις καὶ χρόνου δεῖταί τινος καὶ γενέσεως, ἵνα ἕκαστον δημιουργήσῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἄνευ γενέσεως, τουτέστι διαπλάσεως τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ διαμορφώσεως, τὰ ἀμέσως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γινόμενα ὑφίστησιν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ μόνον τὸ θέλειν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων (30) οὐσίωσιν.”
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Text 16: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, fr. 129 Wildberg = Simplicius, In Phys., 1173, 1-13
“Yet even if it is true”, he says, “that after motion has ceased something remains that has the capacity for being moved, not even in this case does the Philosopher correctly conclude what follows. For if not everything that comes into being does so through motion, but there is, according to Aristotle, a coming-into-being all at once (athroa), without motion and temporal extension, then there is also a destruction that is like that, such as the presence (5) of perfect forms in their substrates, and their withdrawal from them, and like points come to be united, and like contacts, and lightning, and the apprehension of visual sensation. Therefore, not everything that perishes does so through motion”. Thus, he would be saying — for he seems to me to have left his argument without (10) a conclusion — that even if what causes destruction perishes, it does not necessarily perish through motion. “And if God the demiurge”, he says, “produces without temporal extension the heavens and the world, produced directly by him, then when he should wish to destroy the world, its destruction”, he says, “will also be non-temporal”.
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“ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰ ἀληθές, φησί, τὸ μετὰ τὸ παύσασθαι τῆς κινήσεως ὑπομένειν τι τὴν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι δύναμιν ἔχον, οὐδὲ οὕτω καλῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ὁ φιλόσοφος συλλογίζεται. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα διὰ κινήσεως γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀθρόα γένεσις κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη χωρὶς κινήσεως καὶ χρονικῆς παρατάσεως, ἔστι καὶ φθορὰ τοιαύτη, ὡς ἡ τῶν τελείων εἰδῶν (5) ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις παρουσία τε καὶ ἀναχώρησις καὶ ὡς τὰ σημεῖα γίνεται ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει καὶ ὡς αἱ ἁφαὶ καὶ ἀστραπαὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ὀπτικῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀντίληψις. οὐ πᾶν ἄρα τὸ φθειρόμενον διὰ κινήσεως φθείρεται”. ὥστε φαίη ἄν (αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀσυμπέραντον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταλέλοιπε (10) τὸν λόγον), ὅτι κἂν φθείρηται τὸ φθεῖρον, οὐ πάντως διὰ κινήσεως φθείρεται. “καὶ εἰ ὁ θεός, φησίν, ὁ δημιουργὸς ἄνευ χρονικῆς παρατάσεως παράγει τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἀμέσως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παραγόμενα, καὶ ὅτε φθεῖραι τὸν κόσμον θελήσοι, ἄχρονος, φησίν, ἔσται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ φθορά”.
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Text 17 : Al-Kindi, On the quantity of Aristotle's books, p. 375, 9 ff. Abū Rīda, translation M. Rashed 2008
Then Aristotle said (...) that God, may He be praised, does not need a period of time for His creation, in reason of what he made clear, since he established ‘it’ out of ‘not it’ ; so that the one whose ability reached such a point as to produce bodies out of no bodies and to extract being out of not-being, he does not need, since he has the power of producing out of no matter, (15) to produce in time. For since the human act is impossible without matter, the act of the one who does not need matter in order to produce what he produces does not need time.
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ṯumma qāla (...) innahu, jalla ṯanā’uhu, lā yaḥtāju ilā madda l-ibdā‘ihi mimmā abāna, li-annahū ja‘ala « huwa » min « lā huwa » fa-inna man balaġat qudratihi anna ya‘milu ajrāmā min lā ajrām, fa-aḫraja aysa min laysa, fa-laysa yaḥtāju — iḏ huwa qādir ‘alā-l-‘amal min lā ṭīna — anna (15) ya‘milu fī zamān, li-annahu, iḏ kāna fi‘l al-bašar lā yumkinu min ġayr ṭīna, kāna fi‘l man lā yuḥtāju fī fi‘l mā yaf‘alu ilā ṭīna lā yaḥtāju ilā zamān.
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Text 18: Theology of Aristotle, p. 27 Badawi = p. 237 d'Ancona et al. = p. 14 Dieterici ; trans. Lewis I, §§ 44-58, p. 231
How well and how rightly does this philosopher describe the Creator when he says : “He created mind, soul, nature, and all things else”, but whoever hears the philosopher's words must not take them literally and imagine that he said that the Creator fashioned the creation in time. If anyone (10) imagines that of him from his mode of expression, he did but so express himself through wishing to follow the custom of the ancients. The ancients were compelled to mention time in connection with the beginning of creation because they wanted to describe the genesis of things100, and they were compelled to introduce time into their description of becoming and into their description of the creation — which was not in time at all — in order to distinguish between the exalted first causes and the lowly secondary causes (...) But it is not so : not every agent performs his action in time, nor is every cause prior to its effect in time.
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wa mā aḥsan wa aṣwab mā waṣafa al-faylasūfu al-bāri’ ta‘ālī iḏ qāla: innahu ḫāliq al-‘aql wa-l-nafs wa-l-ṭabī‘ati wa-sā’ir al-ašyā’ kullihā, ġayr annahu lā yanbaġī al-sāmi‘ qawli al-faylasūf anna yanżuru ilā lafẓihi fa-yatawahhimu ‘alayhi annahu qāla inna al-bāri’u innamā ḫalaqa-l-ḫalq fī zamānin. fa-innahu wa-in (10) tuwuhhimu min lafẓihi wa kalāmihi fa-innahu innamā lafẓ bi-ḏālika irādata anna yatbi‘u ‘āda al-awwalīna. fa-innahu innamā uḍṭurru al-awwalūna ilā ḏikr zamānin fi badi’ al-ḫalq li-annahum arādū waṣfa kawn al-ašyā’ fa-uḍṭurrū ilā anna yadḫalū al-zamān fī waṣfihum al-kawn wa-fī waṣfihum al-ḫalīqa allatī lam takūn fī zamānin al-battata. wa-innamā uḍṭurrū al-awwalūna ilā ḏikr al-zamān ‘inda waṣfihum al-ḫalīqa li-yumayyazū bayna al-‘ilal al-uwalī al-‘āliya wa bayna al-‘ilal al-ṯawānī al-sfliya (...) wa laysa ḏālika ka-ḏālika, a‘nī annahu laysa kull fā‘ilin yaf‘alu fi‘lihi fī zamānin, wa lā kull ‘illa qabla ma‘lūlihā bi-zamānin.
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Text 19: Pseudo-Fārābī, Harmony of Plato and Aristotle, p. 64 Martini Bonadeo
The meaning of Aristotle's discourse according to which the world has no temporal beginning is that it did not come into being bit by bit, according to a succession of parts, as happens for instance for plants and animals101. This is because what comes into being bit by bit, according to a succession of parts, has some parts that precede others in time (...) the celestial spehere derives from the creation of the Creator – may he be praised ! – at one single time, without duration in time...
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wa ma‘nā qawlihi inna al-‘ālam laysa lahu bad’ zamāniyya annahu lam yatakawwanu awwalān fa-awwalān bi-ajzā’ihi kamā yatakawwanu al-nabat miṯlān aw al-ḥayawān. iḏ allaḏī yatakawwanu awwalān fa-awwalān bi-ajzā’ihi fa-in ajzā’uhu yataqaddamu ba‘ḍihā ‘alā ba‘ḍ bi-l-zamān (...) wa yṣḥḥḥ bi-ḏālika annahu innamā yakūna ‘an ibdā‘ al-bārī jalla jalālihi iyyāhu duf‘ata bi-lā zamān...
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Text 20: Porphyry, Commentary on the Timaeus, fr. LI, p. 38, 5ff. Sodano = Procl., In Tim., vol. 1, 395, 10ff. Diels, translation Runia-Share (modified)
Fourth and next is the section of [Porphyry's] (I, p. 395, 10 Diehl) arguments in which he shows that the divine Intellect practises a mode of creation [which is performed] just by being and establishes [this] by a number of arguments. Even artisans [he says] need tools for their activity [only] because they do not have mastery over all [their] material (hulê). They show this themselves by using these tools to get [their] material] (15) ready for use (euergos) by drilling, planing, or turning it, all of which [operations] do not add form, but [merely] eliminate the unreadiness of the [materal which is] to receive the form. The actual rational formula (logos) [of the work], on the other hand, supervenes upon (paraginesthai) the material (hupokeimenon) timelessly from the art once all inhibiting factors have been removed. And if there were no inhibiting (20) factor in the case of [artisans] either, they [too] would add the form to the matter instantaneously and have absolutely no need of tools (...) If, then, human arts and the imaginations of individual [human] souls and the operations of demons achieve such results, is it surprising that the Demiurge should bring perceptible [reality] into existence just (p. 396, 5) by thinking the universe, generating the material immaterially and the tanglible intangibly, and partlessly extending the extended?
And one should not be surprised if something which is is incorporeal and unextended should be able to cause the existence of the universe. If it is the case that the human semen, which is so small in bulk yet (10) contains within itself all of the [seminal] reasons, gives rise to so many differences (...) it will certainly be much more the case that the demiurgic reason is able to bring all things into existence, since it has no need at all of matter for its existence, as has [the reason] associated with the semen. For this latter is not outside of matter, whereas the creator (hypostatês) of all things is eternally fixed in himself, and has brought all (25) things into existence out of his abiding (menein) self.
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Τέταρτον πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων (10) κεφάλαιον, ἐν ᾧ τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδεικνύει τῆς δημιουργίας αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τὸν θεῖον νοῦν ἐπιτελούμενον, καὶ κατασκευάζει διὰ πλειόνων· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τεχνῖται δέονται πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὀργάνων διὰ τὸ μὴ πάσης κρατεῖν τῆς ὕλης, δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖς102 τοῖς ὀργάνοις χρώμενοι πρὸς τὸ εὐ- (15) εργὸν ποιῆσαι τὴν ὕλην, τρυπῶντες ἢ ξέοντες ἢ τορνεύοντες, ἃ δὴ πάντα οὐ τὸ εἶδος ἐντίθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξαιρεῖ τὴν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τοῦ δεξομένου τὸ εἶδος· αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀχρόνως ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης παραγίνεται τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, πάντων ἐξαιρεθέντων τῶν ἐμποδών.
καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν καὶ τούτοις ἐμ- (20) πόδιον, τό τε εἶδος ἀθρόως ἂν τῇ ὕλῃ προσῆγον καὶ ὀργάνων οὐδὲν ἂν ὅλως ἐδεήθησαν (...) εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τέχναι ἀνθρώπιναι καὶ ψυχῶν μερικῶν φαντασίαι καὶ δαιμόνων ἐνέργειαι τοιαῦτα δρῶσι, τί θαυμαστὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν τὸ πᾶν (5) ὑπόστασιν παρέχεσθαι τῷ αἰσθητῷ, ἀύλως μὲν <παράγοντα> τὸ ἔνυλον, ἀναφῶς δὲ ἀπογεννῶντα τὸ ἁπτόν, ἀμερῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τὸ διαστατόν;
καὶ οὐ δεῖ τοῦτο θαυμάζειν, εἴ τι ἀσώματον ὂν καὶ ἀδιάστατον ὑποστατικὸν εἴη τοῦδε τοῦ παντός· εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοσοῦτον ὄγκον ἔχον καὶ (10) πάντας ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοὺς λόγους, ὑφίστησι τοσαύτας διαφορὰς (...) πολλῷ δὴ οὖν μᾶλλον ὁ δημιουργικὸς λόγος τὰ πάντα παράγειν δύναται μηδὲν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τῆς ὕλης δεηθείς, ὥσπερ ὁ τοῦ σπέρματος· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω ὕλης, ὁ δὲ τῶν πάντων ὑποστάτης ἐν ἑαυτῷ διαιωνίως ἕστηκε καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μέ- (25) νοντος τὰ πάντα παρήγαγε.
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Text 21: Procl., In Tim., vol. 2, p 102, 6 ff. Diehl, translation Baltzly modified
God brings forth all things at once (athroôs) and throughout eternity. For it is through his very being and through his eternal thinking of wholes that he engenders all the things that result from him – the totality of things both hypercosmic and encosmic: intellects, souls, natures, bodies, (10) and matter itself. If you ask me, demiurgic creation exhibits this ‘all at once’ aspect more than the Sun's illumination does. In the latter case, the entire light proceeds simultaneously from the Sun. But even though the Sun imitates the Father through visible creation, this is clearly inferior to the Father's eternal (15) and invisible production. Therefore, as we said, though all things have come about from the act of creation eternally and simultaneously, nonetheless the order of effects is still preserved ; for each thing proceeds all at once and each with its own order since there was present in that which produced it an eternal though and an order prior to the things that have been ordered.
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Ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀθρόως πάντα καὶ διαιωνίως παράγει· κατ’ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰώνιον τῶν ὅλων νόησιν ⟦καὶ⟧ τὰ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ἀπογεννᾷ, τά τε ὑπερκόσμια καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σύμπαντα, νόας, ψυχάς, φύσεις, σώματα, (10) τὴν ὕλην αὐτήν. καὶ εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἀπογεννήσεως τὸ ἀθρόον ἐστὶν ἢ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἐκλάμψεως, καίτοι καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης ἅμα τῷ ἡλίῳ τὸ ὅλον πρόεισι φῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος ὁ τὸν πατέρα μιμούμενος διὰ τῆς ἐμφανοῦς δημιουργίας δῆλον ὡς ὑφεῖται τῆς διαιωνίου (15) καὶ ἀφανοῦς ποιήσεως. πάντων δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς δημιουργίας ὁμοῦ καὶ αἰωνίως παραγομένων ὅμως καὶ ἡ τάξις σῴζεται τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων· πρόεισι γὰρ ἀθρόως ἕκαστα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν τάξεως· ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ παράγοντι καὶ νόησις αἰώνιος καὶ τάξις ἡ πρὸ τῶν τεταγμένων.
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ПЕРЕВОДЫ / TRANSLATIONS
Гемин
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