Text 9: Themistius, In Phys., 3, 1, p. 68, 30 ff. Schenkl, translation M. Chase
Let it be stated with regard to what has been said that motion is one of those things that has many meanings. In addition, that each of these things in which we said motion (30) is present, exists and is spoken of in two ways, either as better or worse. In the case of substance, this double aspect appears as form and privation, in the case of quantity, one aspect is perfect and the other imperfect, and in the case of quality, one thing is black (69, 1) and the other white, or any other of the contraries ; in the case of place one thing is above and the other below. Now since motion is nothing else apart from these things, it too would rightly be double in every genus. We shall state how this is true in what follows. For the moment, let us say what motion is, making use of what has been determined. First of all, we postulated that it is present in every genus (5) of being in which ‘in actuality’ and ‘in potentiality’ is to be found. I say, then, that motion is the entelechy of what is movable, insofar as it is such. Why has ‘insofar as it is such’ been added ? So that it may come to be in entelechy while the potentiality, of which it is the entelechy, remains and is preserved. The entelechy of each thing is twofold, as in the case of bronze, which is potentially a statue. There is entelechy (10) of it both when it is becoming a statue, and when it has already become one. Yet this latter actualization without the potentiality according to which it was capable of becoming a statue being preserved : for it already is one, and it no longer has the potentiality. Therefore, this is the perfection, not of the potentiality — how could it be, since it destroys it ? — but of the thing in which the potentiality was present. The first-mentioned entelechy, in accordance (15) with which it became a statue, if it preserves the potentiality, I call such an entelechy motion and the perfection of the potentiality, for every perfection preserves what it perfects. For as long as the potentiality is preserved, the motion is also preserved, but once the former has ceased the latter ceases as well. But the potentiality ceases when the form and the shape supervene (...)
Motion, then, is twofold in each genus (...) That motion is such is also clear from another example. When what is buildable comes to be being built in actuality, still maintaining its (p. 70, 1) potentiality, then it is in motion, but once it has been completely built, it henceforth neither preserves its potentiality nor is it in motion. If, then, the entelechy of the buildable, while it remains buildable, is the process of building, and the process of building is a motion, the entelechy of the buildable qua buildable is a motion, and hence of the increasable qua increasable and of the transportable qua transportable. By substitution, one can also (5) say that motion is the first actuality of what exists potentially: for the last one is the change into form in which it is henceforth at rest, but the first one is the journey toward , a journey which is still motion. But since we also call the form an entelechy, and in the proper and absolute sense, it is clear that the journey toward form is toward the entelechy that is in the proper sense and absolute. Therefore, it is not entelechy (10) in the absolute sense ; how could it be, since it is an entelechy that journeys toward such , but is imperfect ? Thus, motion is an entelechy neither in the proper nor in the absolute sense, but qua imperfect.
But it is not also an imperfect activity, but qua activity it is perfect.
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Κείσθω δὴ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων. ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, ὅτι τούτων ἕκαστον ἐν οἷς εἴπομεν (30) εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν, διχῶς ἐστί τι καὶ λέγεται ἢ ὡς ἄμεινον ἢ ὡς φαυλότερον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ διττὸν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δὲ ἀτελές, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ τὸ μὲν μέλαν (69.) τὸ δὲ λευκὸν ἢ ἕτερα ἄττα τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἡ κίνησις οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰκότως καὶ αὐτὴ διττή τις ἂν εἴη καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος. πῶς δὲ ἕξει τοῦτο, ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐροῦμεν·
νῦν δὲ ἀποδῶμεν, τί ἐστιν κίνησις, προσχρώμενοι τοῖς ὡρισμένοις. ἔκειτο δὴ πρῶτον ἡμῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος (5) τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, οἷς ἐνυπάρχει καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ καὶ τὸ δυνάμει. λέγω τοίνυν κίνησιν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει κινητοῦ ἐντελέχειαν ᾗ τοιοῦτον. τί οὖν πρόσκειται ‘ᾗ τοιοῦτον’; ἵνα ἐντελέχεια γένηται μενούσης ἔτι καὶ σῳζομένης τῆς δυνάμεως, ἧσπερ ἦν ἐντελέχεια· διττὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου ἡ ἐντελέχεια, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τοῦ δυνάμει ἀνδριάντος· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ (10) αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ ὅταν γίνηται ἀνδριάς, ἐντελέχεια καὶ ὅταν γένηται ἤδη. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἐντελέχεια οὐκέτι σῳζομένης ἔτι92 τῆς δυνάμεως καθ’ἣν ἠδύνατο γενέσθαι ἀνδριάς. ἤδη γάρ ἐστιν καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει τὸ δυνάμει, διὸ καὶ τελειότης οὐ τῆς δυνάμεως αὕτη (πῶς γὰρ ἣν φθείρει;), ἀλλὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν ᾧ ἡ δύναμις ἦν.
ἡ δὴ πρότερον ῥηθεῖσα ἐντελέχεια καθ’ (15) ἣν ἐγίνετο ἀνδριάς, εἰ τὸ δυνάμει διαφυλάττει, τὴν τοιαύτην ἐντελέχειαν κίνησιν λέγω καὶ τελειότητα τῆς δυνάμεως. πᾶσα γὰρ τελειότης σῴζει ὃ τελειοῖ· ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἡ δύναμις σῴζεται, σῴζεται καὶ ἡ κίνησις, παυσαμένης δὲ παύεται. παύεται δὲ ἡ δύναμις, ἡνίκα ἂν τὸ εἶδος ἐπιγένηται καὶ ἡ μορφή (...).
διχῶς οὖν ἡ κίνησις καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος· (...) ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου παραδείγματος. τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδομητὸν ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται οἰκοδομούμενον, σῷζον ἔτι καὶ τὸ (70.) δυνάμει, τότε κινεῖται, ὡς ὅταν γε οἰκοδομηθῇ παντελῶς, οὔτε τὸ δυνάμει σῴζει λοιπὸν οὔτε κινεῖται. εἰ οὖν ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐντελέχεια μένοντος οἰκοδομητοῦ οἰκοδόμησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ οἰκοδόμησις κίνησις, ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἄρα ὡς οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐντελέχεια κίνησίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ τοῦ αὐξητοῦ ἄρα ὡς αὐξητοῦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ φορητοῦ ὡς φορητοῦ. ἔστι δὴ καὶ μεταλαμβάνοντα (5)εἰπεῖν κίνησιν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος πρώτην ἐντελέχειαν· ὑστάτη μὲν γὰρ ἡ εἰς τὸ εἶδος μεταβολὴ ἐν ᾧ ἠρεμεῖ λοιπόν, πρώτη δὲ ἡ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο πορεία ἥτις ἔτι κίνησίς ἐστιν.
ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐντελέχειαν λέγομεν τὴν κυρίως τε καὶ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ εἶδος πορεία ἐστὶν ἐπ’ ἐντελέχειαν τὴν κυρίως τε καὶ ἁπλῶς. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς (10) ἐντελέχεια. πῶς γὰρ ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν τοσαύτην πορευομένη ἀλλ’ ἀτελὴς ἐντελέχεια; οὕτως οὖν ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια οὐχ ὡς κυρίως οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀτελής.
οὐ μὴν καὶ ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνέργεια τέλειος.
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Text 9b: Aristotle, Al-Ṭabī‘a, p. 171, 8-13 Badawi, quoted by A. Hasnawi 1994, p. 65 n. 27
By perfection (i.e., actualization), he (Aristotle) means here the coming forth of what is potential to actuality, not the completion, such that what is in potentiality would be annulled and what is in actuality would be realized — but rather [the perfection] such that potentiality, remaining stable, persistent, and essential, might act. Indeed, that is when motion takes place (...)
Perfection is twofold : first and last. The last is the arrival at actualization of what is in potentiality, the first is the journey toward the last perfection, with potentiality being preserved along with it, and this is motion.
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Innamā ya‘nī bi-l-kamāli fī hāḏa al-ma‘nā al-ḫurūja mimmā bi-l-quwwati ilā al-fi‘li, lā al-tamāma fa-yabṭulu mā bi-l-quwwati wa yaḥṣulu mā bi-l-fi‘li, bal ‘alā anna al-quwwata ba‘du ṯābitatun bāqiyatun ḏātiyyatun taf‘alu. fa-inna ‘inda ḏālika takūnu al-ḥarakatu (...)
Al-kamālu kamālāni : awwalun wa aḫīrun. Fa-l-aḫīru huwa intihā’ū mā bi-l-quwwati ilā-l-fi‘li, wa-l-awwalu huwa al-taṭarruqu ilā al-kamāli al-aḫīri wa al-quwwatu takūnu ma‘ahu maḥfūẓatan wa huwa al-ḥarakatu.
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Text 10a: Aristotle, Physics, 1, 3, 186a4 ff., trans. Hardie-Gaye
For both of them reason contentiously – I mean both Melissus and Parmenides. [Their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and offers no difficulty at all : admit one ridiculous proposition and the rest follow, a simple enough proceeding] The fallacy of (10) Melissus is obvious. For he supposes that the assumption “what has come into being always has a beginning” justifies the assumption “what has not come into being has no beginning”. Then this also is absurd, that in every case there should be a beginning of the thing – not of the time and not only in the case of coming to be in the full sense but also in the case of alteration – as if change never took (15) place all at once.
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ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης [καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι· μᾶλλον δ’ ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ’ ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δ’ οὐθὲν χαλεπόν]. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πα- (10) ραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον· οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχήν—τοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνο- (15) μένης μεταβολῆς.
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Text 10b: Aristotle, Physics, 8, 3, 253b6-26
...there cannot be a continuous process either of increase or of decrease: that which comes between the two has to be included.
(...) It is evident, then, that from the fact that the decrease is divisible into an infinite number of parts it does not follow that some part must always be passing away : it all passes away at a particular moment. Similarly, too, in the case of any alteration whatever, if that which suffers alteration is infinitely divisible it does not follow from this that the same is true of the alteration itself, which often occurs all at once, as in (25) freezing.
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...οὔτε γὰρ αὐξάνεσθαι οὔτε φθίνειν οἷόν τε συνεχῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ τὸ μέσον.
(...) φανερὸν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀεί τι ἀπιέναι, ὅτι διαιρεῖται ἡ φθίσις εἰς ἄπειρα, ἀλλ’ ὅλον ποτὲ ἀπιέναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλοιώσεως ὁποιασοῦν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μεριστὸν εἰς ἄπειρα τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ’ ἀθρόα γίγνεται πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἡ πῆ- (25) ξις.
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Text 10c: Aristotle, De sensu, 6, 446b28-447a13
Local movements, of course, arrive first at a point midway before reaching their goal (...), but we cannot go on to assert this [arrival at a point midway] in like manner of things which undergo qualitative change. For this kind of alteration may conceivably take place in a thing all at once, without one half of it being changed before the other ; e.g. it is conceivable that water should be frozen simultaneously in every part.
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αἱ μὲν γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφικνοῦνται (...), ὅσα δ’ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι.
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Text 11: Alexander of Aphrodisias, On form and the fact that it is the perfection and accomplishment of motion according to Aristotle, p. 289-290 Badawi = p. 66 Hasnawi 1994
We now return and say that that of motion, some is incomplete and some is perfect, and imperfect motion is an effect (Greek pathos), that is, an accidental quality of the thing. But perfect motion is form, that is, the perfection and completion of the thing, and this is what the Philosopher in his Book of physical audition calls entelechy (anṭālāšyā). The meaning of this term is the flight (al-harabu) of what is potential and possible to perfection and completion,93 which are the form of the thing.
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fa-narji‘u al-āna fa-naqūlu inna mina al-ḥarakati mā hiyya nāqiṣatun wa minḥā mā hiyya tāmmatun. fa-ammā al-ḥarakatu al-nāqiṣatu fa-hiyya al-aṯaru a‘nī kayfiyyata al-šay’i al-‘āriḍata. wa ammā al-ḥarakatu al-tāmmatu [...] fa hiya al-ṣūratu a‘nī tamāma wa kamālahu wa hiyya allatī sammāhā al-faylasūfu fī kitābihi allaḏī yud‘ā Kitābu al-samā‘ī al-ṭabi‘iyyi anṭālāšyā, wa ma‘nā hāḏā al-ismi harabu al-quwwati wa-l-imkāni ilā al-tamāmi wa-l-kamāli allaḏī huwwa ṣūratu al-šay‘i.
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Text 12: Proclus, On the Eternity of the World, apud Philoponus, aet. mundi., p. 55, 22 ff. Rabe, trans. Lang & Macro 2001, p. 51
The Fouth Argument of Proclus the Successor.
Fourth. Each thing generated from a cause that is unmoved (25) according to its substantial reality is unmoved. For if the maker (p. 56, 1 Rabe) is unmoved, he is unchanged, and if unchanged, then he produces by virtue of his very being, given that he shifts neither from making to not making nor from not making to making. For if he shifts, he will experience change in the very transition from the one to the other, and were he to experience change, he would (5) not be unmoved. If therefore something is unmoved, it will either never make or always make ; otherwise, whenever it does make, it would be moved. Consequently, if something unmoved is a cause of something, causing neither never nor sometimes, then it is always a cause, and if so, it is the cause of something perpetual.
If the cause of the all (10) is unmoved – for if it were moved, it would be earlier incomplete and later complete (since every motion is incomplete actuality) and furthermore would need time to bring time into being — then the all must be perpetual, because it come to be from an unmoved cause. Consequently, if someone, intending to pay respect to (15) the cause of the all, should say that the cause alone is perpetual and the cosmos is not perpetual, he asserts that its cause is moved rather than unmoved. By calling the cause moved rather than unmoved, he says that it is not always complete but is at one time incomplete, because every motion (20) is incomplete actuality and so needs something inferior (I mean time) because of its being moved ; yet because he says it is sometimes incomplete and not always complete, i.e., needing something inferior, he in fact shows great disrepect.
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Πρόκλου διαδόχου λόγος τέταρτος.
“Τέταρτος· πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον αἰτίου (25) κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν (56.) ἀκίνητον, ἀμετάβλητόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀμετάβλητον, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι94 ποιεῖ μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐκ τοῦ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν μηδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν· μεταβαῖνον γὰρ ἕξει μεταβολὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ θατέρου μετάβασιν εἰς θάτερον, εἰ δὲ ἕξει μεταβολήν, οὐκ ἂν (5) εἴη ἀκίνητον. εἴ τι ἄρα ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἢ οὐδέποτε ποιήσει ἢ ἀεί, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὸ ποτὲ ποιεῖν κινῆται. ὥστ’, εἴ τι ἀκίνητον αἴτιόν ἐστίν τινος, οὔτε οὐδέποτε αἴτιον ὂν οὔτε ποτέ, εἴη ἂν ἀεὶ αἴτιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀιδίου ἐστὶν αἴτιον.
εἰ τοίνυν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς (10) ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ κινούμενον ἀτελὲς ᾖ πρότερον ὕστερον δὲ τέλειον (πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἀτελής) καὶ ἵνα μὴ κινούμενον χρόνου δέηται χρόνον παράγον, ἀνάγκη τὸ πᾶν ἀίδιον εἶναι ἀπὸ αἰτίου ἀκινήτου γιγνόμενον. ὥστε, εἴ τις εὐσεβεῖν οἰόμενος εἰς (15) τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς ἐκεῖνον λέγοι μόνον ἀίδιον τὸν δὲ κόσμον οὐκ ἀίδιον, τοῦτον λέγων οὐκ ἀίδιον ἐκεῖνον ἀποφαίνει κινούμενον ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητον· κινούμενον δὲ λέγων καὶ οὐκ ἀκίνητον οὐκ ἀεὶ λέγει τέλειον ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν εἶναι κίνησιν (20) ἐνέργειαν ἀτελῆ καὶ ἐνδεᾶ τοῦ χείρονος (λέγω δὴ τοῦ χρόνου) δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀτελῆ λέγων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ τέλειον καὶ ἐνδεᾶ τοῦ χείρονος ἀσεβεῖ διαφερόντως·”
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