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Original text Labour and the locusts: trade union responses to corporate governance regulation in the European Union Laura Horn Introduction In the context of the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007, many observers have looked to the Left for alternative strategies to deal with the fallout from the collapse of finance-dominated, market-driven policies. It is commonly assumed that the crisis not only corroborates the analyses and arguments of critics of unfettered market capitalism, but that we are indeed witnessing a conjunctural “window of opportunity” for alternative policy proposals and political strategies to enter into the policy-making arena. Organized labour, in particular trade unions, perceived as “regulated representative constituencies of the Real Economy” (TUAC 2008), here represents a central node of agency in emerging networks of contestation, on the national as well as the European and international level. As John Monks, then General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), declared, “the conditions are there for a trade union counter attack” (Monks 2008). At the same time, rising job losses and unemployment levels, and pressure on real wages, have put organized labour (once again) in a defensive position. None of the bail-out plans have been initiated in response to pressure from below, that is, from trade union associations or civil society networks. Labour representation and interests are becoming more and more fragmented at both the company and the national level, while the institutional configuration of the EU has been deeply permeated by governance structures that are conducive to market-making, neoliberal policies rather than those conducive to strengthening the alleged “European social model”. A leading scholar of the political economy of European integration has even gone so far as to call trade union enthusiasm about the European social model a “delusion” (Scharpf 2008). What, then, is the role of organized labour at the EU level, and indeed, to what extent does Europe constitute an important political and institutional terrain for alternative socio-economic perspectives and initiatives? This chapter seeks to engage with the agency and strategies of organized labour at the EU level by analysing trade union responses to EU corporate governance regulation.“Corporate governance” here refers to those practices that define and reflect the power relations within the corporation and the way, and to what purpose, it is run (Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007). Corporate governance regulation in the EU is increasingly shifting towards financial market imperatives: that is, towards a regulatory perspective focusing exclusively on the interests of shareholders (Horn 2011). Labour law, once an integral part of regulating the modern corporation, is more and more relegated to the area of social affairs and employment law, and provisions for workers’ rights with regard to corporate control are increasingly marginalized. Questions of corporate control, as expressed in corporate governance regulation, go to the very heart of late industrialized capitalism. It is in this arena that contesting ideological perspectives on ownership and socio-economic organization collide most immediately. Yet whereas collective bargaining, the right to strike and working conditions have been at the centre of trade union strategies and demands, regulation of corporate governance and financial markets on the EU level has often come about outside the purview of trade unions. It is only in recent years that corporate control and corporate governance have become more politicized and contested, often in parallel with the broader debate about corporate ownership and the debate about alternative investment structures. The chapter is structured as follows. The next section offers an overview of the conceptual and political discussions surrounding the agency of organized labour at the EU level. Subsequent sections introduce corporate governance regulation, both conceptually and as a crucial element of neoliberal restructuring at the EU level, in particular with regard to the marketization of corporate control. Here, the shift from the focus on “industrial democracy” in the 1970s to that on a “shareholder democracy” in the mid-2000s serves as a storyline. The chapter then concludes with a view on recent developments, in particular with regard to the financial and economic crisis. Perspectives on organized labour at the EU level International political economy analyses have long focused on the agency of transnational capital and business actors, while a focus on labour as a political actor has been fairly marginal (Harrod and O’Brien 2002: 15). A common perception is that organized labour, despite its often internationalist ideology, is still rooted at the national level and has become a conservative and inflexible force with dwindling membership, unable to adapt its strategies to the new supra- and transnational realities. And indeed, as Hyman sums up (2004: 19–20), the challenges to traditional unionism have been manifold, ranging from external factors, such as the intensification of competition across countries, regions and sectors, the internationalization of chains of production and the deregulation of the labour market, to internal challenges such as the erosion of the “normal” employment relationship, extensive social and generational changes and the consequent decline of trade union membership. Trade unions, as the primary manifestation of organized labour in industrialized capitalism, are faced with a fundamental dilemma. While on the one hand their objective is to at least negotiate the worst social consequences of capitalism with a focus on the underprivileged, at the same time the majority of their rank-and-file membership is composed of the relatively advantaged, core section of the working class. (The pattern of course varies according to the political and confessional orientation of particular trade unions.) This dilemma raises the questions of whose interests trade unions represent, and which interests take precedence in their immediate and long-term actions (Hyman 2004: 23). How these interests are represented depends upon organizational and political choices made by the trade unions. Here unions often find themselves in a situation as managers of discontent (see Mills 1948). In order to comply with their own political and social goals, and maintain the allegiance of their members, trade unions have to articulate (elements of) class struggle at the individual, firm, sectoral or national level. Yet at the same time, in order to maintain their standing as acknowledged political actors, recognized for their intermediary role between workers on the one hand, and employers and the State on the other, they need to constrain this class struggle and channel it into manageable relationships in order to maintain the class compromises that underlie many of the advanced industrial ized capitalist societies. There are different mechanisms through which organized labour can seek to advance these objectives. Traditional union strategies have been class action at the firm, sectoral or national level, as well as close political cooperation with social democratic or other (confessional) parties. Through these means organized labour has long represented an interest group in national politics, manifest in, for example, corporatist arrangements. Increasingly, trade unions have also become engaged in “partnerships” with business at the firm level, in firm-specific agreements (which in the case of multinational corporations can take on a transnational character). International cooperation between trade unions through, for example, Global Union secretariats or TUAC has become more important for the coordination and organization of union strategies; however, the main space for action remains at the national level. As will be discussed in more detail in the following section, in recent years unions have increasingly established cooperation with social movements (see Bieler 2008). However, as Hyman points out, engaging in “contentious politics” potentially “redefines unions as outsiders in a terrain where until recently the role of insiders was comforting and rewarding” (Hyman 2004: 22). Indeed, as the next section shows, with regard to organized labour at the EU level the insider role does seem to have been more appealing so far. In the shadow of integration? Trade union agency at the EU level Organized labour, in particular the ETUC, has been perceived as, put bluntly, co-opted into the project of neoliberal restructuring (Bieling and Schulten 2003; see also Taylor and Mathers 2004). The ETUC and the European Industry Federations, set up as lobby organizations for worker interests at the EU level, have been incorporated into the emerging system of labour relations characterized by the European Social Dialogue and firm-level agreements. In particular, reassured by the implicit promises latent in Delors’ vision of a “European social model”, trade unions entered into a tacit agreement that intensified market competition and deregulation were unavoidable (Bieling 2001: 100). The institutionalization of the Social Dialogue in the Maastricht Social Chapter in 1991 has led to what Bieling and Schulten have called symbolic Eurocorporatism, incorporating trade union associations into the hegemonic bloc supporting neoliberal restructuring, while all the same “keeping alive their functionalist hopes of a slow but steady expansion of European social regulation” (Bieling and Schulten 2003: 245). The Social Dialogue channelled conflicts between capital and labour into a non-binding social partnership forum, effectively blunting the sharp edges of the antagonistic relations resulting from neoliberal restructuring. Trade union strategies at the EU level are mainly articulated within the EU institutional framework. This, however, means that initiatives and policy objectives also remain within the broader political context of neoliberal restructuring, rather than posing a fundamental alternative to it. The question then remains to what extent organized labour can indeed be seen as a potential counter-hegemonic actor, and to what extent the institutional terrain of the EU would be the appropriate place for social struggles. Yet even though the space for organized labour agency is limited, there remain avenues for trade unions. As Erne points out, unions are not passive victims of the EU integration process but agents capable of politicizing its contradictions (Erne 2008: 199). While labour has, in the absence of strong uniform representation on the EU level and framed in the soft model of the Social Dialogue, acquiesced in the neoliberal programme under the promise of competitiveness and job growth, there is now increasing disillusionment with the flanking measures of the European social model. In order to analyse the potential for contestation of and resistance to neoliberal socio-economic restructuring, the position and agency of subaltern classes in European governance have to be seen from a perspective that acknowledges the fundamental power asymmetries in the EU (Van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2008). It is through the articulation of, and struggle between, concrete political projects that social forces shape European integration. Regulation here represents a juridico-political manifestation of the struggle between particular political projects, albeit one subject to political concessions and compromises. Rather than perceiving regulation as a functional outcome of the drive to improve efficiency by correcting market failures, in the understanding of this study regulatory developments are perceived as part and parcel of political projects. As Van Apeldoorn’s analysis (Van Apeldoorn 2002) of rival projects of European integration shows, the crucial question is: what kind of market is being promoted? The concept of the political project here serves as a starting point for the analysis, enabling its discursive and operative dimensions to be investigated empirically, while at the same time it is seen in the context of wider structural changes. As concrete, and more or less coherent, manifestations of social interests with regard to particular socio-economic issues, political projects are subject to internal contradictions as well as contestation by opposing social forces. As such, it is through an analysis of political struggle, as well as of the compromises and consensus necessary to sustain hegemonic projects, that the contours of rival political projects become most clear. Hegemony in a Gramscian sense is in fact never complete, and subordinate groups and classes may always struggle to redefine the terms of the dominant discourse and transform underlying social practices. This point, again, indicates the open-ended nature of the process of European integration, as well as the emancipatory potential within the European arena. The transformation of corporate governance regulation at the EU level Corporate governance here refers to those practices that define and reflect the power relations within the corporation and the way, and the purpose to which, it is run. This understanding of corporate governance differs from a law and economics perspective in focusing on the social power relations in the corporation, rather than perceiving corporate governance mainly as a technical solution for agency problems; for example, how “investors get the managers to give them back their money” (Shleifer and Vishny 1996: 737). At the level of the firm, this latter interpretation is expressed most clearly in the rise of “shareholder value” as the new ideological paradigm for corporate governance (cf. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005). The marketization of corporate control puts the corporation, its management and workers more firmly under the discipline of the capital market. In this context it is important to emphasize that the organizational form of the modern corporation did not come about as the inevitable outcome of economic processes, in which it emerged as the most efficient – that is, transaction-cost-minimizing – way of organizing production. Its organizational form, as well as its purpose (that is, in whose interest it should be run), is continuously sustained by the legal framework provided through the State. Rather than seeing corporate governance regulation in terms of de- or reregulation, as is often the case, what we need to explain is the qualitative change in corporate law and other regulatory domains pertaining to the social relations of the corporation. The focus here needs to be on the political process through which a particular regulation regime emerges, with law as a fundamental arena for political struggle. After the crisis? Regulatory reactions in corporate governance at the EU level While the financial crisis has been most prominently a crisis of liquidity, it has also revealed the pathologies of market-based corporate governance. Regulatory reactions, however, have without exception adopted a problem-solving approach, focusing on “fixing the flaws” in the system rather than considering radically different policy choices. Given the firm entrenchment of the shareholder value paradigm within the regulatory domain, this does not really come as a surprise. Rather, it is a continuation of the corporate governance discourse already articulated in response to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. The question confronting regulators, then, is not whether marketized corporate governance regulation can (or should) be maintained, but how to find best practices to make the system work better; how to fine-tune technical issues; and, if necessary, how to insert regulatory gussets to ensure supervision capable of pre-empting market failures. This is rather well illustrated by the OECD’s identification of the issues most immediately linked to financial crisis: the governance of remuneration processes; effective implementation of risk management; board practices; and the exercise of shareholder rights (OECD 2009: 2). At the EU level, following the report by the De Larosière group, a reconstruction of financial market supervision has been initiated. The Commission has also drawn up regulatory initiatives in direct response to the failure of several corporate governance mechanisms that have become central in corporate governance practices in the EU, for example with regard to executive remuneration, albeit only in the form of recommendations. Most provisions for enhanced disclosure and control mechanisms for executive remuneration, however, pertain to shareholders and the board only, rather than granting other stakeholders voice, or at least a right to consultation (beyond employer representation on boards) on these important issues. It is notable that the bulk of regulatory initiatives in response to the crisis have concerned regulations pertaining to market mechanisms which had previously been brought up by a variety of actors, including the ETUC – for instance, with regard to the regulation of credit-rating agencies – but were only taken up by the Commission in reaction to the crisis. Is another mode of corporate governance possible? The discussion about corporate governance has become increasingly politicized, with the European Parliament taking an ever more critical position on the Commission’s policy initiatives. The Commission’s decision to drop the 14th Company Law Directive for the cross-border transfer of the registered office of a company, which resulted in a resolution in the Parliament, or the debates over the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive, demonstrate that, in contrast to just a decade ago, corporate governance has indeed become a contested concept at the EU level. Interestingly, the European Commission seems to have developed doubts about its own policies, as a recent Green Paper by the Commission confirms: the financial crisis has shown that confidence in the model of the shareholder owner who contributes to the company’s long-term viability has been severely shaken, to say the least … The Commission is aware that this problem does not affect only financial institutions. More generally, it raises questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance rules based on the presumption of effective control by shareholders. (European Commission 2010) This is quite remarkable, given that just a couple of years ago the then Commissioner McCreevy was still keen on declaring shareholders “king or queen” of the corporation. However, this tentative expression of a potential change in regulatory orientation raises several important questions. At this stage, it remains to be seen whether the by now firmly embedded marketization of corporate control will prove resilient to the regulatory changes spurred on by the immediate and mid-term regulatory responses to the crisis. Is the European Commission, situated as it is within the terrain of strategic selectivity, indeed backpedalling on its earlier programme, or is this mainly a discursive shift, a concession to assuage public criticism until neoliberal order is restored? It is important to note here that, while the Commission’s statement is very interesting indeed, as argued above the “common sense” of corporate governance has not changed in its core.5 Corporate control is still perceived as bifurcated, with control for shareholders within the corporate governance and company law domain, and all issues pertaining to “stakeholders” situated within the domain of social affairs and employment. Corporate social responsibility, environmental reporting and socially responsible investment might all be significant avenues meriting exploration within the regulatory terrain of the EU, but as long as control remains firmly isolated and exclusively allocated to owners of capital, the core of the marketization project remains intact. However, as the financial crisis and its consequences have exacerbated the growing asymmetries in the EU, the contestation of these EU policies has also strengthened, in particular in the context of the sustained legitimacy crisis of the European Union. Both the epistemic contestation of shareholder value and strategic alliances formed by organized labour have become more prominent. An expert group commissioned by the ETUI has recently drawn together and published an edited volume emphasizing the urgency and necessity of a “sustainable company” concept (Vitols and Kluge 2011). The contributions discuss the academic and intellectual history of the shareholder value paradigm and establish the underlying principles for a sustainable company. Moreover, a range of ideas and demands that organized labour, the European Parliament and NGOs have been putting forward for a long time are now being openly discussed – who would have ever expected to see Member States’ governments and the European Commission embracing the idea of a financial transaction tax? Concluding remarks Whether the current financial and economic crisis indeed represents a conjunctural terrain upon which opposition to neoliberal European governance can be formed remains to be seen. With regard to corporate governance and company law at least, organized labour has for the most part been struggling to maintain and defend the concessions made by capital at the EU level, rather than establishing an alternative to neoliberal restructuring. With the immediate regulatory response directed at the “obvious” culprits – that is, in the case of this financial crisis, investment bankers and credit-rating agencies – the scope for further regulatory action is increasingly limited by the established market-making regulation and the legal basis of European integration. What is more, the assumption that the crisis will be a turning point for neoliberal market integration is premature as long as the structural dominance of financial capitalism is still prevalent in the EU. However, this does not necessarily mean that trade unions have no option but to revert to mainly national strategies. Trade unions are increasingly using the EU as an alternative space for mobilization, and are also increasingly voicing criticism about European governance (Gajewska 2008). At the same time, the European Parliament is becoming an important ally for trade union organizations (witness, for example, the call for a Social Progress Clause in the Lisbon Treaty). However, in order to overcome the neoliberal bias of European state formation, trade unions would indeed have to participate in, or even initiate, the articulation of a counter-hegemonic project that would transcend the wide-ranging internal discussions and tensions within the labour movement. An alternative conception of corporate governance would have to be carried forward by a broader alliance of public and civil society actors. Translation Труд и финансовые спекулянты: ответ профсоюзов на урегулирование корпоративного управления в Европейском союзе Лаура Хорн Введение В условиях финансового и экономического кризиса, который начался в 2007 году, многие наблюдатели стали обращаться к левым идеям в поисках альтернативных стратегий для борьбы с последствиями распада финансово-доминирующей, ориентированной на рынок политики. Обычно предполагается, что существование кризиса подтверждают не только анализы и аргументы критиков неограниченного рыночного капитализма, и мы и вправду убеждаемся в этом, становясь свидетелями конъюнктурного «окна возможностей» для альтернативных политических предложений и стратегий, созданных для выхода на политическую арену. Организованные трудящихся, в частности, профсоюзы, рассматриваемые как "институционализированные, имеющие представительство участники реальной экономики" (Профсоюзный консультативный комитет при Организации экономического сотрудничества и развития (ПКК при ОЭСР), 2008), в данном случае представляют собой центральное связующее звено всех развивающихся сетей борьбы как на национальном и европейском, так и на международном уровне. Как заявил Джон Монкс, предыдущий Генеральный секретарь Европейской конфедерации профсоюзов (ЕКП): "Созданы все условия для профсоюзной контратаки" (газета «Monks» 2008). В то же время, сокращение рабочих мест, рост уровня безработицы и давление на реальный уровень заработной платы вынудили организованных трудящихся (еще раз) занять оборонительную позицию. Не было инициировано ни одного плана ликвидации, организованного против давления снизу, то есть, против профсоюзных объединений или сетей гражданского общества. Представительство рабочих и их интересов становится все более и более фрагментированным как в компании, так и на национальном уровне. Тем временем институциональная структура ЕС была глубоко пронизана структурами управления, которые поощряют неолиберальные меры, поддерживающие рынок, а не те меры, которые способствуют укреплению так называемой "Европейской социальной модели". Ведущий ученый политической экономии в области европейской интеграции зашел так далеко, что назвал профсоюзный энтузиазм по поводу европейской социальной модели "заблуждением" (Шарпф, 2008). В чем же тогда заключается роль организованных трудящихся на уровне ЕС, и в какой степени на самом деле Европа предоставляет важную политическую и институциональную почву для альтернативных социально-экономических перспектив и инициатив? В этой главе автор стремится охватить представительство организованных трудящихся на уровне ЕС и их стратегии, анализируя ответы профсоюзов на регулирование корпоративного управления в ЕС. Термином «Корпоративное управление» называются те практики, которые определяют и отражают принципы распределения власти внутри корпорации, ее основные способы и цели она стремится (Ван Апелдорн и Хорн, 2007). Регулирование корпоративного управления в ЕС все больше смещается в сторону императивов финансового рынка: то есть, в сторону точки зрения регулирования, сосредоточившись исключительно на интересах акционеров (Хорн, 2011). Трудовое право, как неотъемлемая часть регулирования современной корпорации, все больше и больше относится к сфере социальных вопросов и трудового права, а положения для прав трудящихся в отношении корпоративного контроля становятся более маргинальными. Отвечая на вопросы корпоративного управления, связанные с их регулированием, перейдем в самое сердце позднего индустриального капитализма. Именно в этой области непосредственно сталкиваются спорящие идеологические перспективы в отношении собственности и социально-экономической организации. Но в то время как проводились коллективные переговоры, а право на забастовку и условия труда всегда находились в центре профсоюзных стратегий и требований, регулирование корпоративного управления и финансовых рынков на уровне ЕС часто проходили вне поля зрения профсоюзов. И только в последние годы корпоративный контроль и корпоративное управление стали более политизированы и оспариваемы, и часто проводятся параллельно с широкой дискуссией о корпоративной собственности и дебатами об альтернативных инвестиционных структурах. |
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